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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles-Determination of Family Membership Under
the Family Purpose Doctrine.
A grandson was driving the defendant's family automobile when
the plaintiff's intestate was killed through the negligent operation of
the car. The trial court refused to submit to the jury' an issue as to
the grandson's membership in the defendant's family. Held, judg-
ment for plaintiff reversed. The facts tend to show that the driver
was not a member of the defendant's family within the meaning of
the family purpose doctrine, and the issue should have been sub-
mitted to the jury under "proper instructions". While the instant
case leaves in some doubt whether "proper instructions" would be a
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directed verdict in favor of the defendant, this is at least a permissible
interpretation of the court's opinion. Thus there is presented the
question of what persons are members of an automobile owner's
family within the purview of the family purpose doctrine.1
This doctrine is applicable in various situations. Where a hus-
band maintains a car for the pleasure and convenience of his wife
and himself, he is answerable for the negligent operation of the
vehicle by his wife.2 Similarly, when the member of the family using
the car is a dependent son, a minor residing with his father, a judg-
ment against the father is proper under the doctrine." If the driver
is a stepdaughter, toward whom the owner stands in loco parentlis,
the result is the same.4 On the other hand, a twenty-four year old
son who works for his father for small wages, in addition to his
board and room, is not a member of the family within the meaning
of the doctrine, and his father is entitled to a peremptory instruction
in his favor.5 Likewise, an adult daughter, a school teacher paying
for her board and room with her parents, is not regarded as a mem-
ber of the family.6 A statute establishing a presumption of consent
when the family car is driven by an immediate member of the family
is not operative as to a nephew who is employed by his uncle and
pays for his board and room.7 It has been held, nevertheless, that a
married man, twenty-five years old, who had failed in his own bus-
iness and was then employed by his father for twenty dollars a week,
as well as his board and room, is sufficiently dependent upon his
father for liability to attach to the latter.8
The dominant consideration throughout the reported cases in
determining the existence of the required family relationship is the
degree of dependence of the tort-feasor upon the family head for
support.9 Age and emancipation are not considered decisive of the
status of a person as a member of a family.'0 And further, the mere
fact that the negligent driver resides with the car owner is not enough
'McGee v. Crawford, 205 N. C. 318, 171 S. E. 326 (1933).
'Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 356, 167 Pac. 966 (1917).
'Allen v. Garabaldi, 187 N. C. 799, 123 S. E. 66 (1924).
'Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922).
'Bradley v. Schmidt, 223 Ky. 784, 4 S. W. (2d) 703 (1928).
'Scott v. Greene, 242 I1. App. 405 (1926).
'Rogers v. Kuhnreich, 247 Mich. 204, 225 N. W. 622 (1929).
'Watson v. Burley, 105 W. Va. 416, 143 S. E. 95 (1928).
'Johnston v. Hare, 30 Ariz. 265, 246 Pac. 546 (1926); Jones v. Golick, 46
Nev. 10, 206 Pac. 679 (1922); Cole v. Wright, 18 S. W. (2d) 242 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929).
Watson v. Burley, .rnpra note 8.
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to establish the relationship. 1 It should be noted that in the cases
which hold the owner liable, the driver of the automobile is usually
related to him by blood or marriage.12 In brief, since the occasion
for the development of the doctrine was the financial irresponsibility
of the individual dependent family member, 13 the degree of depend-
ence upon the family head represents the most appropriate and
conclusive test of the family relationship.
The holding in the principal case appears to be in accordance with
the general trend of judicial opinion. The boy came to the home of
his grandfather at the age of seventeen, just two years before the
mishap, under an express agreement by which he was to clerk in his
grandfather's store for a small salary, in addition to his board and
lodging. Because an exchange of mutually gratuitous services is
characteristic of the family relationship, the court emphasizes this
factor as a test, and in this respect the opinion is perhaps unique
among the family automobile cases. Although the holding is justified
in the light of the earlier decisions, it is possible that due regard for
the interest of the injured party would warrant an extension of the
family purpose doctrine to this and similar situations.
ERvm ERIc ERICSON.
Banks and Banking-Collection Items "as Preferences.
In the December, 1933, issue of the NORTH CAROLINA LAW RE-
VIEW there was an inadvertent omission of a citation to the North
Carolina statute in footnote 11 of an article which appeared under the
heading, "Banks and Banking." Through such omission some per-
sons may erroneously have been led to believe that there was .no
statute in this state allowing preferences with reference to collection
items caught in banks which subsequently become insolvent. This
statute may be found in N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §218 (c),
subsection 14. It has been discussed at length in this review on two
occasions: 6 N. C. LAW REVIEW 175-176; 8 N. C. LAW REVIEW 55,
at 59 ff. HARRY W. MCGALLIARD.
'Jones'!. Golick, supra note 9.
' Mogle v. Scott & Co., 144 Minn. 173, 174 N. W. 832 (1919) (no recovery
for employee's use of car) ; Reich v. Cone, 180 N. C. 267, 104 S. E. 530 (1920)
(no liability for butler's driving) ; Keller v. Federal Bob Brannon Truck Co.,
151 Tenn. 427, 269 S. W. 914 (1925) (doctrine not applicable to corporations).
Contra: Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 138 Atl. 365 (1927) (priest's
housekeeper held to be member of. his family).
Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile (1928) 26 MIcE.
L. REv. 846; McCall, The Family Automobile (1930) 8 N. C. L. Rxv. 256.
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Conditional Sales-Repossession by Seller.
Two recent North Carolina cases involved the retaking of auto-
mobiles sold under conditional sales contracts which reserved to the
seller the right to enter upon the premises where the property might
be located and remove same upon default of the buyer. In both cases
it was held that possession must be taken under circumstances which
do not involve a civil trespass.'
In all conditional sales of personal property the title remains in
the vendor.2 It is not necessary that this retention of title be ex-
pressly stated in the contract. Such reservation may be implied from
its conditions.3 Upon default of the buyer the title and the right to
possession immediately unite in the seller.4
Conditional sales contracts usually contain a stipulation giving the
seller the right to retake the chattel without legal process in case of
buyer's failure to make payments as agreed. But even though such
right of retaking has not been specifically reserved, a majority of the
courts will allow the vendor to retake the property without resorting
to legal action. 5 In order to effectuate the retaking, such contracts
ordinarily provide for the seller's entry upon the premises where the
property may be located and his removal of the same without being
subject to liability for trespass. Even though the contract does not
so provide, the seller has an implied license to enter the premises of
the vendee in order to remove the property.0 In spite of such pro-
visions, however, the vendor may incur liability in repossessing.
The extent of the vendor's liability in exercising his right of re-
possession upon default of the buyer may best be illustrated by the
following actual case situations. Where the seller sat in the auto-
mobile with the buyer and did not retake the car until the buyer
' Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 N. C. 257, 171 S. E. 63
(1933); Narron v. Holleman Chevrolet Co., 205 N. C. 307, 171 S. E. 93
(1933).2 Edson & Co. v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 132 Misc. 223, 228 N. Y. S. 582(1928) ; Frick v. Hilliard, 95 N. C. 117 (1886) ; Lundberg v. Kitsap County
Bank, 79 Wash. 75, 139 P. 769 (1914).
'Walters v. Americus Jewelry Co., 114 Ga. 564, 40 S. E. 803 (1902) ; Pease
v. Teller Corp., 23 Idaho 807, 128 Pac. 981 (1913); McManus v. Walters, 62
Kan. 128, 61 Pac. 686 (1900).
'Lee v. Nat'l. Furniture Stores, 163 S. C. 204, 161 S. E. 450 (1932).
'Deere Plow Co. v. City Hardware Co., 175 Ala. 512, 57 So. 821 (1912);
Blackford v. Neaves, 23 Ariz. 501, 205 Pac. 587 (1922) ; Jones v. Williams, 40
Ga. App. 819, 151 S. E. 695 (1930).
'Wilmerding v. Rhodes Haverty Furniture Co., 122 Ga. 312, 50 S. E. 100
(1905) ; Heath v, Randall, 4 Cush. 195 (Mass. 1894) ; Wash. v. Taylor, 39 Md.
592 (1874).
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finally left, he was subject to no liability ;7 but it was held otherwise
where the seller removed the buyer from the car.8 Where the repos-
sessed automobile was parked in front of the buyer's home, the seller
was immune from liability for removing it;9 but to the contrary
where he broke open the buyer's garage in order to. remove the car.' 0
Where the buyer sat upon the stove in order to prevent its recaption,
the seller suffered no liability in lifting her from it;" but where the
purchaser sat upon the sewing machine in order to prevent its re-
moval, the vendor became liable for tipping the machine so as to
cause the buyer to slide off and suffer injury.12 In a case where the
purchaser was pregnant and in ill health and the seller removed all
the furniture from the house, thus aggravating her illness, the seller
suffered no liability ;18 but where the seller broke into the house in
the buyer's absence, he was held liable in an action for damages. 14
Where the purchaser from the vendee had notice of the conditional
sale of the safe, the vendor was held free from liability in repossess-
ing the safe from this third person ;15 but it was held otherwise where
the third person was a bona fide purchaser for value.' 6
Although no definitely crystallized set of rules can be formulated
which will enumerate with precision the rights of the seller in regain-
ing possession of the property upon the buyer's default, it seems that
the following conclusions may be drawn: (1) Title and right to pos-
session being in the vendor, he cannot be liable for wrongful con-
version in retaking the property.17 (2) The seller is immune from
liability for trespass where the possession is regained peaceably.
(3) A majority of the courts allow no force to be exercised in the
retaking. The minority will allow the exercise of that amount of
'Driver v. State, 116 Neb. 666, 218 N. W. 588 (1928).
8 Roberts v. Speck, 169 Wash. 613, 14 Pac. (2d) 33 (1932).
' State v. Stinnett, 203 N. C. 829, 167 S. E. 63 (1933).
"Dominick v. Rea, 226 Mich. 594, 198 N. W. 184 (1924).I Biggs v. Seufferlein, 164 Iowa 241, 145 N. W. 507 (1914).
'Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N. E. 793
(1911).
Flaherty v. Ginsberg, 135 Iowa 743, 110 N. W. 1050 (1907).
"Van Wren v. Flynn, 34 La. Ann. 1158 (1882).
Sunel v. Riggs, 93 Wash. 350, 160 Pac. 950 (1916) (The notice may be
either actual or constructive, i.e., by registration).
" Mathewson v. Brigman Motors Co., 23 Ga. App. 304, 98 S. E. 98 (1919).1 Cf. Walker v. Ayers, 169 S. E. 784 (Ga. App. 1933) (Buyer on a condi-
tional sale contract refused to pay installments until the radio repaired. Seller
retook for purpose of repairing and refused to return. Held, buyer did not
forfeit right to possession by "default" under such circumstances, and seller
guilty of conversion).
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force reasonably necessary, the seller being responsible in assault and
battery for any excessive force.
J. CARLYLE RUTLEDGE.
Constitutional Law-Due Process and Equal Protection
in Respect to Hours of Employment Statutes.
In State v. Harvey' a statute prohibiting the employment of men
in mercantile establishments more than eight hours a day and forty-
eight hours a week 2 was held void as repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution and to the Constitution of
New Mexico 3 in that it: (1) deprived the employer and employee of
liberty (to contract) without due process of law; and, (2) denied the
equal protection of the laws.
As industry in the United States advanced it became apparent that
employer and employee did not occupy positions of equality and that
the relationship was subject to great abuses by the employer. To
remedy this a great many regulatory statutes have been enacted. 4
One class of regulatory statutes limited directly the hours of employ-
ment of certain classes of employees in specified industries. The em-
ployers, as was to be expected, tried to protect their dominant posi-
tion as a constitutional right and contended that such regulations
were invalid under either or both of the provisions above set out. The
results of these tests can best be observed by dividing the cases into
the following five classes.
I. Children Employees. Statutes regulating the hours that chil-
dren may be employed are in force in every state and in every case
the regulation has been held valid.6 Indeed, it seems hard to believe
125 P. (2d) 204 (N. M. 1933).
'N. M. LAWS 1933, c. 149.
"ART. 2, §18.
'For example: McLean v. State of Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct.
206, 53'L. ed. 315 (1908) (Holding valid a statute requiring coal to be meas-
ured for payment of wages before screening) ; Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U.
S. 686, 34 Sup. Ct. 761, 58 L. ed. 1155 (1914) (Upholding a statute requiring
payment of wages at specified periods and in cash); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 42 Sup. Ct. 615, 66 L. ed. 1044 (1922) (Statute requiring
employer to issue a service letter to employee leaving his service held valid) ;
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785
(1923) commented upon (1923) 71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 360 and (1923) 9 VA. L.
Ray. 639 (Holding invalid a statute providing for a minimum wage for women
employees in the District of Columbia).
'Sturges & Burns Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 34 Sup. Ct. 60,
58 L. ed. 245 (1913) ; Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 172 Ind. 423, 87 N. E. 229
(1909).
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that there were ever any bona fide contentions of invalidity, since
children never have been sui juris.
II. Female Employees. A thorough search of the records dis-
closed but three cases in which statutes limiting the hours of employ-
ment of women have been held invalid and all of these have since
been overruled." In all of the six cases in which it has considered
such statutes, the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the
regulation. 7 The same result has been reached in all the later cases
in the state courts in respect to validity under the state constitutions.8
In addition to holding that such regulation does not deprive the
parties of liberty so as to be repugnant to the respective "due process"
clauses, most of the cases specifically hold the fact that the provisions
apply to some industries and not to others closely related not to be a
denial of equal protection.9 Thus it appears to be well established
that the hours a woman may be employed can be regulated.
'Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454. (1895) (holding invalid a
statute limiting employment of women to eight hours a day and forty-eight
hours a week) overruled by W. C. Ritchie Co. v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91
N. E. 695 (1910) (upholding a ten-hour day); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41
Neb. 127, 59 N. W. 362 (1894) (The statute here applied to all employees and
the court in ruling it invalid made no distinction between males and females)
overruled by Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N. W. 421 (1902) (a ten-hour
day for women held valid); People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131, 81 N. E. 778
(1907) (held invalid a statute prohibiting women from working between
9 P. M. and 6 A. M.) overruled by Radice v. People of New York, 234 N. Y.
518, 138 N. E. 429 (1923) aff'd, 264 U. S. 292, 44 Sup. Ct. 325, 68 L. ed. 690
(1923) commented upon (1924) 13 CALIF. L. REv. 82 and (1924) 19 ILL. L. REv.
100 (holding valid a statute prohibiting women from working between 10 P. M.
and 6 A. M.).
" Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. ed. 551 (1907)
(ten-hour day) ; Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. 469, 58 L.
ed. 788 (1914) (ten-hour day, fifty-six-hour week) ; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S.
373, 35 Sup. Ct. 342, 59 L. ed. 628 (1915) (eight-hour day, forty-eight-hour
week) ; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U. S. 385, 35 Sup. Ct. 345, 59 L. ed. 632
(1915) (eight-hour day, forty-eight-hour week) ; Dominion Hotel v. Arizona,
249 U. S. 273, 39 Sup. Ct. 273, 63 L. ed. 597 (1919) (eight-hour day) ; Radice
v. People of New York, supra note 6.
8Withy v. Bloem, 163 Mich. 419, 128 N. W. 913 (1910) (nine-hour day);
State v. Ehr, 57 N. D. 310, 221 N. W. 883 (1928) commented upon (1929) 2
DAM. L. REv. 399 (eight and a half-hour day and forty-eight-hour week) ; State
v. Collins, 47 S. D. 325, 198 N. W. 557 (1924) (ten-hour day, fifty-four-hour
week); State v. Somerville, 67 Wash. 638, 122 Pac. 324 (1912) (eight-hour
F34or example: Miller v. Wilson, supra note 7 (Regulation applies to em-
ployment in mercantile establishments and hotels but not to lodging and board-
ing houses and offices) ; Radice v. People of New York, supra note 6 (applies
to employees in restaurants who serve as waitresses, cooks, etc., but not to
entertainers or cloakroom attendants in such restaurants, nor to employees in
hotels and restaurants operated solely for the benefit of employees) ; State v.
Somerville, supra note 8 (applies to mercantile and mechanical establishments,
laundries and hotels but not to harvesting, packing, canning or drying and fruit
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III. Male Employees on Public Works. The early statutes limit-
ing the number of hours a contractor on a state job could require his
employees to work were held invalid.10 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, held that the government has the right to prescribe the terms
upon which work can be done for it, and that the exercise of that
right does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.'" It is now settled
that such regulations are valid,12 and such statutes are in force in
most of the states. One state limits the hours to thirty a week.'8
IV. Male Employees in Dangerous Occupations. The constitu-
tions of several of the western states specifically empowered the leg-
islatures to enact statutes limiting the hours of employment in mines,
smelters, reduction plants and similar industries.' 4 About a dozen
states have such statutes in force.' 5 In the first test case, the Utah
Court held the statute valid 16 and this decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States.17 With one exception' s this
result has been unanimously followed and at the present the validity
of such statutes is unquestioned.' 9
V. Male Employees in Non-Dangerous Occupations. In respect
to statutes of this category some five cases have been found which
deny validity. The first, decided in 1892, held invalid a statute limit-
ing to eight hours a day the employment of "all classes of mechanics,
servants and laborers. '20 The second is the oft-cited case of Loch-
or vegetable or canning fish or shellfish, a large part of Washington indus-
tries).
"
0Ex parte Kubach, 85 Cal. 274, 24 Pac. 737 (1890); People v. Orange
County Road Const. Co., 175 N. Y. 84, 67 N. E. 129 (1903).
' Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 48 L. ed. 148 (1903)
(eight-hour day).
'Byars v. State, 2 Okla. Cr. 481, 102 Pac. 804 (1909) (eight-hour day);
Ex parte Steiner, 68 Ore. 218, 137 Pac. 204 (1913) (eight-hour day).
' UTAH LAws 1933, c. 39.
'For example: IDAHO CONSTITUTION (1890) ART. 13, §2.
'For example: CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) §4933; Mo. Rxv. STAT.
(1929) §13206.
'Holden v. Hardy, 14 Utah 71, 46 Pac. 756 (1896) (eight-hour day).
11 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780 (1898).
'In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 58 Pac. 1071 (1899) (The court granted that
the statute was valid under the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses but
held that it violated the provision of the state constitution guarantying to all
persons that right of acquiring and holding property. Immediately thereafter
the people of Colorado amended their constitution to empower specifically the
legislature to enact such a statute (CoLo. CONsT. ART. V, §25A) and it does
not appear that the subsequent statute has ever been questioned.
"Ex parte Martin, 157 Cal. 51, 106 Pac. 235 (1909) ; State v. Livingston
Concrete Bldg. Co., 34 Mont. 570, 87 Pac. 980 (1906) ; In re Boyce, 27 Nev.
299, 75 Pac. 1 (1904).
" Low v. Rees Printing Co., supra -note 6.
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ner v. People of New York,21 in which the United States Supreme
Court, in 1905, by a 5-4 decision, held invalid a statute limiting em-
ployment in bakeries to ten hours a day. The remaining three cases
involved respectively, a limitation of employment in bakeries to six
days a week, 22 an eight-hour day for stationery firemen, 23 and a
nine-hour day for baggage-men, station laborers and crossing watch-
men.24 All three decisions were based directly upon the decision in
the Lochner case.
On the other hand, as early as 1902, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island held valid a ten hour day for employees of street car com-
panies, 25 but the value of this case as a precedent was, of course,
overcome by the decision in Lochner v. People of New York. In
1912, however, the Court of Mississippi specifically adopted the
minority view in the Lochner case and upheld a statute providing for
a ten-hour day "in manufacturing and repairing establishments.1 26
A like result was reached as to statute limiting employment in laun-
dries to eleven hours a day.2 7 Then, in 1917, in the leading case,
Bunting v. Oregon,2s the Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, held valid
a statute limiting to ten hours a day employment in mills, factories
and manufacturing establishments. It further ruled specifically that
even though the analogous employment in stores, offices, construction
work and the like was not included, there was no denial of equal
protection.
Even though Lochner v. People of New York was not mentioned
in the decision in the Bunting case, since it can hardly be said that
there is any fundamental difference between employment in a mill
and employment in a bakery, the net result seems to be that the
Lochner case is overruled sub silentio. It follows that the decisions
based directly upon the decision in the Lochner case are likewise
overruled. This leaves standing intact only the old case of 1892
holding such regulations invalid. In what appears to be the only
case involving this point decided since Bunting v. Oregon, a nine-
hour day, fifty-four-hour week for drug clerk was upheld.29
.198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. ed. 937 (1905).
' State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 561, 125 S. W. 507 (1910).
State v. Barba, 132 La. 768, 61 So. 784 (1913).
:' Comm. v. Boston & M. R. Co., 222 Mass. 206, 110 N. E. 264 (1915).
In re Ten Hour Law, 24 R. I. 603, 54 AtI. 602 (1902).
'8 State v. J. J. Newman Lumber Co., 102 Miss. 802, 59 So. 923 (1912).
Ex parte Wong Wing, 167 Cal. 109, 138 Pac. 695 (1914).
u243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 61 L. ed. 830 (1917).
Ex parte Twig, 188 Cal. 261, 204 Pac. 1082 (1922).
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The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and many state
constitutions that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or
property without due process of law" does not prohibit the legislature
from enacting all laws reasonably necessary to protect the health,
morals, safety and general welfare of the citizens under the state's
police power.30 More concisely, regulation within the police power
is due process.
In testing the validity of hours-of-employment statutes the ques-
tion seems always to have been narrowed to whether or not the reg-
ulation as a health measure ("morals, safety and general welfare"
seem never to have been considered as having any application) was
reasonable or arbitrary.3 1 Since the determination of what is reason-
able or arbitrary must be, in all cases, purely a matter of opinion, it
would seem that the justices should not substitute their own social
and economic beliefs for those of the people, as expressed through
their representatives in the legislature. This viewpoint has been
adopted in a great many cases.3 2
The principle admitting of regulation being established, on what
grounds can a court say as a matter of law, that the eight-hour day
for male employees of mercantile establishments involved in the in-
stant case is less reasonably a health measure than an eight-hour day
in smelters,38 a ten-hour day in mills,84 or an eight-hour day for
women in hotels, telephone exchanges and mercantile establish-
ments ?35
Furthermore, in light of the cases reviewed, the contention that
the regulation denies the equal protection of the law is without merif.
The regulation to be valid must apply equally merely to all members
of the class named in the statute.3 6 Of course, the classification must
not be arbitrary.3 7 Classifications based on the difference between
" Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. ed. 923 (1884);
Hiller v. State, 124 Md. 385, 92 Atl. 842 (1914).
'For example: Lochner v. People of New York, supra note 21; Muller v.
Oregon, supra note 7.
"Bunting v. Oregon, supra note 28; State -v. J. J. Newman Lumber Co.,
supra note 26.
Supra, notes 16, 17, and 19.
Supra, notes 26 and 28.
'Snpra, notes 7 and 8.
'Radice v. People of New York, supra note 6.
'See American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 92, 21 Sup. Ct.
43, 45 L. ed. 102 (1900).
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employees in hotels and employees in lodging houses, 8s between
student nurses and graduate nurses,39 between waitresses and cloak-
room attendants, 40 and between employees in mills and employees in
construction work 41 have been held valid. Clearly, the establishment
as a class for regulation of the employees of mercantile establishments
is at least equally within the police power, even though such anal-
ogous employments as clerking in banks and offices are not regulated.
There being in the Constitution no provision specifically forbid-
ding the regulation of the hours of employment, it would seem that
the expression of opinion by the legislature as to the reasonableness
of the enactment should prevail. In the instant case, however, the
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to advance the personal social
and economic philosophy of its members in opposition to the prevail-
ing social and economic philosophy in this country and in New Mex-
ico in respect to the hours of labor.4 2 Such use of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not come within its true purpose and has done
much to build up opposition to judicial review of legislation.
IRVIN E. ERB.
Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel in Civil Actions.
The plaintiff brought suit in a federal court to quiet title to
Indian lands. The defendant set up a prior determination of the
county court as a conclusive adjudication of his status as an heir.
The plaintiff thereupon produced evidence showing that the county
court had denied her request to be heard through counsel of her own
choice, except by permission of, and in subordination to, counsel ap-
pointed by the court who persistently hindered and opposed her own
representative. Held: The plaintiff was denied due process of law
Miller v. Wilson, supra note 7.
' Bosley v. McLaughlin, supra note 7.
"Radice v. People of New York, supra note 6.
"
1 Bunting v. Oregon, supra note 28.
" The prevailing attitude as to the general desirability of the shortening of
the hours of labor is clearly manifested by the provisions with respect to labor
in the National Industrial Recovery Act [48 Stat. 198 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A.
Supp. §707 (1933)]. Even though it might be said that shorter days for labor
generally are not reasonably necessary to protect the health of the laborers con-
cerned, still the regulation may be valid as necessary to protect the health of
the general public, in that shorter hourA spread employment and thereby permit
men now unemployed to raise their families from the mere subsistence level
afforded by the relief agencies to a more healthful standard of living.
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in the county court, hence its judgment was not entitled to full recog-
nition in the federal court.'
In England it has always been one's right to have full assistance
of counsel in civil actions. In criminal prosecutions, however, this
was not true except as to misdemeanors. 2 In the United States arbi-
trary action of state courts in depriving one of what is rightfully his
is prohibited by the "due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Courts take the position
that the intent and application of this provision ought not to be de-
fined with complete finality but, rather, "by the gradual process of
inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision require."8
In criminal actions in the state courts it has always been held that
adequate and effective representation by counsel, unless waived, is
an integral part of due process. 4 By analogy, the same rule should
apply with equal force to civil suits.5
Adequate notice and hearing have long been recognized as
elements of due process.6 Hearing is interpreted to mean through
counsel, if desired.7 The implication seems clear that one is entitled
to counsel of his own selection, a view recently expressed by the Su-
preme Court in the much publicised Scottsboro case:8 "If in any case,
civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to
hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it rea-
sonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of
hearing, and therefore due process in the constitutional sense."
While the particular problem of the instant case seems never to
have arisen before in the United States, the court's solution appears
amply justified as being within the scope and purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment and therefore is not open to the charge of being
'Roberts v. Anderson, 66 F. (2d) 874 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
' 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LimrTATioNs (8th. ed. 1927) 698. Prior to
1688 one accused of a felony was denied aid of counsel. After the revolution
of that year the rule was abolished as to treason, but was otherwise steadily
adhered to until 1836, when by act of Parliament the full right was granted in
respect to felonies generally.
See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104, 24 L. ed. 616 (1877).
'Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N. E. 773 (1920) ; Comm. v. O'Keefe,
298 Pa. 169, 148 Atl. 73 (1929) ; note (1889) 2 t. R. A. 655.
'The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment comprehend both civil and
criminal actions alike.
'Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 53 L. ed. 97 (1908);
State v. North, 304 Mo. 607, 264 S. W. 678 (1924) ; McGEHEE, DUE PaOCESS
oF LAw (2d ed. 1906) 73-84.
' Cooke v. U. S., 267 U. S. 517, 45, Sup. Ct. 390, 69 L. ed. 767 (1925).
'Powell v. Alabaina, 287 U. S. 45, 69, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 77 L. ed. 158 (1932).
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an unwarranted or undesirable extension of power of federal over
state courts. 9  WILSON BARBER.
Insurance-Health and Accident Policies-
Total Disability Clause.
The insured was adjudicated insane on May 21, 1932. Shortly
afterwards his committee began an action to recover payments from
Oct. 1, 1930 under a clause in a health and accident policy, providing
for certain benefits upon proof that the insured "has become phys-
ically and incurably disabled by bodily injury . . . or disease, so that
he is and will be thereby permanently, continuously and wholly pre-
vented from engaging not only in his own occupation, but also in any
and every other occupation whatsoever, and from performing work
of any kind for compensation of any kind whatsoever." The insured
has, apparently, continued in his position as clerk of court up to the
time the action was commenced. Held, reversing a judgment direct-
ing a verdict for the defendant, that the question of insured's total
disability was for the jury.1
The familiar principle that an insurance policy is construed in a
light most favorable to the insured2 is nowhere more apparent than
in cases involving the so-called "total disability" clause of health and
accident policies. Such provisions are always given a most liberal
interpretation;3 and the courts have not been hesitant in declaring
that the purpose of this type of insurance is to provide for payments
'U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588 (1875). As a general rule,
federal courts will interfere with state action on the ground that it is repugnant
to the "due process" clause only where fundamental rights have been denied.
' Caldwell v. Volunteer State Life Insurance Co., 170 S. E. 349 (S. C.,
1933).2 Thompson v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 287, 34 L. ed. 408 (1889).
The reason most commonly given for this rule is the fact that the policy is
written by the company, and the insured has practically no choice in the phrase-
ology employed. In this connection, however, it is interesting to note that, in
some jurisdictions, the policy is construed in favor of the insured even though
it be in the form required by statute. Smith v. National Fire Insurance Co. of
Hartford, Conn., 175 N. C. 314, 95 S. E. 562 (1918). Contra: Buccola v. Na-
tional Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn., 18 La. App. 353, 137 So. 346(1931).(3But see Saveland v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 67 Wis. 174, 30 N. W. 237,
239 (1886) ("But there is no law to prevent the parties from making their
own contract. The plaintiff consented to and made this one. He cannot re-
pudiate or alter its conditions in the day of his calamity. The courts are power-
less to make a new contract for him; or to strike out some words from the
contract he made for himself and insert others, and thus enlarge the risk, in
order to meet the expectation of the plaintiff in obtaining the policy").
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upon the occurrence of some contingent event, and that they will not
suffer the policy to become a virtual sham through its description of
that event, if such a result may reasonably be avoided.4
The strictness, or liberality, with which such terms as "totally dis-
abled" "wholly prevented5 from performing each and every duty
pertaining to his occupation," and the like are construed will depend
to some extent upon the jurisdiction in which the case arises. It is
probable, however, that no court would require a condition of abso-
lute helplessness as prerequisite to a recovery on the policy. The
insured's ability to perform a few trivial and inconsequential acts in
connection with the business in which he is insured will not prejudice
his rights.7 By what appears to be the great weight of authority, it will
suffice if his condition be such that he is no longer capable of doing
the substantial and material acts necessary to the conduct of such
business.8 Nor does the fact that the insured is physically able to
"United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McCarthy, 50 F. (2d) 2 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1931) ; Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Nancarrow, 18 Colo. App. 274, 71 Pac.
423 (1903); Hooper v. Accidental Death Insurance Co., 5 Hurl. & N. 546
(1860).
'The word "prevented," one often used in these policies, has been declared
by some courts to be synonymous with "hindered." Booth v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 3 N. J. Misc. 735, 130 Atl. 131 (1925); Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Joiner, 178 S. W. 806 (Tex. Civ. App., 1915). However. as the
words are commonly used, there would seem to be a difference in their mean-
ings. The former suggests that performance has been defeated, while the
latter suggests that it has been handicapped.
' When the policy, as in the principal case, provides that the insurance is
against total disability in any occupation, and not the insured's own occupa-
tion, some courts have held that it is sufficient if the insured be totally disabled
from performing the duties pertaining to his own occupation. National Life &
Accident Insurance Co. v. O'Brien's Ex'x, 155 Ky. 498, 159 S. W. 1134 (1913) ;
McCutchen v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 153 S. C. 401, 151 S. E. 67
(1929) criticised (1930) 4 Tur. L. REv. 657. The majority, however, have
recognized a distinction, and hold that "any" occupation means, not merely
that in which the insured is engaged, but also such occupations for which he is
fitted by nature, experience, or training. Industrial Mutual Indemnity Co. v.
Hawkins, 94 Ark. 417, 127 S. W. 457 (1910); Parten v. Jefferson Standard
Life Insurance Co., 30 Ga. App. 245, 117 S. E. 772 (1923) ; Buckner v. Jeffer-
son Standard Life Insurance Co., 172 N. C. 762, 90 S. E. 897 (1916). It has
been held that, under a policy insuring against total disability "from perform-
ing each and every duty pertaining to his (insured's) occupation," the in-
surance company was not entitled to set off amounts earned by the insured in
other occupations during his period of disability. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
New York v. Bynum, 221 Ky. 450, 298 S. W 1080 (1927).
'Davis v. Midland Casualty Co., 190 Ill. App. 338 (1914); Thayer v.
Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co., 68 N. H. 577, 41 At. 182 (1896) ;
Smith v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of The United States, 205
N. C. 387, 171 S. E. 346 (1933) ; 6 CooLEY, BgiEFs oN INSURANcE (2 ed. 1928)
5538; VANCE, INSURANCE (2 ed. 1930) §272.8 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Bovello, 56 App. D. C. 275, 12 F. (2d)
810 (1926) ; Young v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 80 Me. 244, 13 Atl. 896 (1888)
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continue his labors, per se, preclude a recovery, provided his condi-
tion is such that reasonable care and prudence require that he desist
in order to effect a speedy cure;9 although it has been held that,
should he continue in his occupation under these circumstances, he is
not entitled to the stipulated payments. 10 These rules are vague and
indefinite, and they are, perhaps, open to criticism on the grounds
that they furnish no adequate test with which to determine a doubt-
ful claim without resort to litigation; nevertheless, insurance com-
panies evidently have been unable, or unwilling, to employ a more
definite phraseology, as policies embodying provisions similar to that
in the principal case are constantly being written, despite the fact that
so many of them find their way into the courts.
There are many decisions which take cognizance of the fact that
these policies, by their own words, insure not primarily against the
loss of income, but against the loss of ability to work.11 Thus, the
magnanimous employer who continues the employee's salary during
his period of disability will not absolve the insurer from liability.
Considered in this light, the decision of the principal case would seem
justifiable. A man who has become the victim of some mental dis-
order might easily continue, nominally, to hold a position when, in
fact, his services are worthless. The court hinted that such was the
(a leading case); Misskelley v. Home Life Insurance Co., 205 N. C. 496
(1933). Contra: Lyon v. The Railway Passenger Assurance Co.. 46 Iowa 631(1877); cf. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Getzendanner, 93 Tex. 487, 56 S. W.
326 (1900).
'Sherman v. Continental Casualty Co., 103 Cal. App. 518, 284 Pac. 946
(1930) ; Hohen v. Interstate Casualty Co. of New York, 115 Mich. 79, 72 N.
W. 1105 (1897); Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Mutual Aid Ass'n of Chatfield,
Minn., 69 Minn. 14, 71 N. W. 696 (1897) (a leading case).
" Cato v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 164 Ga. 392, 138 S. E. 787 (1927).
In a number of these cases the insured has made an effort to continue his
labors, but has been allowed to recover on the policy. An honest, though un-
successful, effort to work should not relieve the insurer from liability, but may
be considered as evidence that the insured was not disabled. Travelers' Insur-
ance Co. v. Plaster, 210 Ala. 607, 98 So. 909 (1924) ; Sherman v. Continental
Casualty Co., supra note 9; Jones v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 166
Minn. 100, 207 N. W. 179 (1926); Rathbun v. Globe Indemnity Co., 107 Neb.
18, 184 N. W. 903 (1921).
t' Bachman v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 78 N. H. 103, 97 Ati. 223, 227
(1916) (The insured received a blow on the head which seriously affected his
mentality; however, during part of the time for which payments are claimed,
he was able to obtain a few orders and earn $830.00 in the course of two
months. The court said: "The contract is not one of indemnity against loss
of income. It insures against loss of capacity to work. The issue is not
whether money has been received, but whether work has been done, or could
have been done") ; cf. Great Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 25 S. W.
(2d) 1093 (Tex. Comm. of App., 1930) (The insured continued to manage his
business, but with such inefficiency that he went bankrupt).
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situation. In reply to the defendant's contention that, should judg-
ment be rendered for the plaintiff, some sixty deeds would be ren-
dered ineffectual, it remarked that "the uncontradicted evidence is
that the deeds were prepared by the clerk's deputy, who directed
Caldwell when and where to sign." Possibly this may be taken as
an indication that the insured was in such a state of mental decline as
to be no longer capable of performing his duties1 2 and that his pay
was a gratuity. J. B. ADAMs.
Insurance-Recent Trends In Group Insurance.
With the end of the World War many employers throughout the
United States, actuated by paternalistic altruism or by a desire to
make employment more secure with a greater efficiency on the part
of the employees, began to buy group insurance. In some cases the
employer pays the entire cost of such insurance, while in others the
cost is shared by the insured employees.
These policies cover all or part of those working for the subscrib-
ing employer and under them, employees, without individual selec-
tion, can be insured at a very low cost. The insurance companies
assume these risks without requiring a prior medical examination,
since they can regulate the minimum number of employees to be
covered by the policy, and since experience has shown the average
length of life in such groups to be normal.
While in the ordinary contract of insurance there are but three
interested parties-the insurer, the insured, and the beneficiary, group
insurance contracts concern four-the insurer, the employer who
holds the master policy, the insured employee who holds a certificate
evidencing his right under the master policy, and the beneficiary.
It is only recently, with the great increase in litigation on such
policies, that the complex nature of the contract became evident. The
first statute regulating this new branch of the insurance business was
enacted in New York,' and similar statutes more or less copied from
I Cf. Thigpen v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 204 N. C. 551, 556,
168 S. E. 845 (1933) (where there was some evidence that insured was in-
capable of performing his duties as court crier, the court said: "Nevertheless,
it is beyond question that the services of the court crier were satisfactory to
the public authorities, because they actually paid his monthly stipend of $40.00.
The law is designed to be a practical science, and it would seem manifest that
a plain, every-day fact, uncontroverted and established, ought not to be over-
thrown by the vagaries of opinion or by scientific speculation").
2N. Y. Ins. Laws (1918) §101a. This statute provides among other things
that group insurance cover not less than fifty persons and be based upon
some plan that will avoid individual selection. When premiums are paid by
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this one now appear in some twenty states.2
In construing group insurance contracts the general tendency
seems to have been to apply the rules of ordinary insurance and of
contracts without much appreciation of the special nature of these
policies. By pursuing this course, it has been held: that the main
contract is between the employer and the insurer and that the insured
employee acquires his rights as a third party beneficiary3 ; that the
individual certificates are subordinated to the master policy even
when the statute declares that the policy, certificates, and the applica-
tion together constitute the contract 4 ; that the insurer owes no duty
to notify the insured employee of the termination of the policy5 ; that
the employer is not the agent of the insurance company to waive
conditions in the policy,6 nor to receive notice of claims for the in-
surer,7 nor to solicit the insurance within the meaning of statutes
employer and employee jointly, seventy-five percent of the employees must be
covered. Moreover, such policies may be extended to units of the National
Guard or Naval Militia of any state, state troopers or police, members of any
labor union, debtors or buyers on installment from the same institution, and
any World War veteran's society.
Policies must contain the following provisions: that the policy will become
incontestable two years after the date of issuance; that the policy, individual
certificates, and applications constitute the whole contract; that in absence of
fraud all statements are to be taken as representations and not warranties;
that no statement can be used in defense to a claim unless made in a written
application; that there is to be an equitable adjustment of premiums or insur-
ance payable in event the employee's age has been misstated; that individual
certificates are to be delivered to the employer, to be delivered in turn to the
insured employees; that an individual policy will be issued to any employee
upon the termination of his employment; that new employees may constantly
be added to the list of insured.
Also, no such policy or the proceeds therefrom are liable to garnishment or
attachment, before or after payment, to pay any debt of the employee or
beneficiary.
'For example: N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §6466 (a)-§6466 (b); PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) title 40 §§531-534.
'Carruth v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 608, 122 S. E. 226 (1924); Metro-
politan L. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 142 So. 721 (La. App. 1932) ; Magee v. Equitable
L. Assur. Soc., 62 N. D. 614, 244 N. W. 518' (1932) ; see Davis v. Metropolitan
Ins. Co., 161 Tenn. 655, 32 S. W. (2d) 1034 (1931) ("The courts which have
considered these group-policy contracts have held that the contracting parties
were primarily the employer and the company. The policy is applied for by
the employer and issued to the employer, and the insuring company has no
direct contractual relations with the several individual employees. It is the
employer who pays the premiums to the company, and there is no liability
therefor to the company on the part of the individual employees. The rights
which the employees acquire are incidental merely").
'Seavers v. Metropolitan L. Assur. Soc., 132 Misc. 719, 230 N. Y. S. 366
(1928).
Beecey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 267 Mass. 135, 166 N. E. 571 (1929) ; Magee
v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., supra note 3.
'Duval v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 82 N. H. 543, 136 Atl. 400 (1927).
" Ammons v. Assurance Soc., 205- N. C. 23 (1933).
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making the solicitor an agent of the insurer.8 Further, as to the
relation between the employer and employee, most courts hold that
the employer's acts relating to the insurance are gratuitous 9 ; that the
employer is under no duty on his own initiative to advise the insured
employee concerning the terms of the policy10 ; and that the insured
employee cannot include his lost rights in a group policy among his
damages in an action to recover for wrongful discharge."1
There is, however, a minority group which displays a tendency to
overthrow these orthodox tenets and to adjust the law so as to give
to group insurance the maximum social usefulness while still keeping
it within proper bounds. Pursuit of this policy has evinced a tend-
ency to hold that the relationship between the insured employee and
the insurer is stronger than that of a third party beneficiary and that
the insurance, in so far as paid for by the employer, is not a mere
gratuity but a contract right supported by the consideration of a
presumed increase in the employee's interest in his work and of a
decreased turnover in labor.12 In addition, it has been recognized
that the employee has a right to receive notice from the insurer con-
cerning termination or changes in the policy.'8 One case holds that
" Conn. Gen. L. Ins. Co. v. Speer, 185 Ark. 615, 48 S. W. (2d) 553 (1932);
Davis v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 161 Tenn. 655, 32 S. W. (2d) 1034 (1931).
'Myerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94 (1927) (held
that although the insured could sue the employer for wrongful cancellation of
the insurance contract upon the theory of a gratuitous agency, the beneficiary
could not because of the want of consideration); Kowalski v. Aetna L. Ins.
Co., 266 Mass. 255, 165 N. E. 476 (1929).
"Kowalski v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., supra note 9.
"Gary v. Central Ga. Ry. Co., 37 Ga. App. 744, 141 S. E. 814 (1928).
'Thompson v. Pacific Mills, 141 S. C. 303, 139 S. E. 619 (1927); see
Carruth v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 608, 122 S. E. 226 (1924) (certificate
stated that the employer was not acting philanthropically but expected co6per-
ation in return for the insurance. Thus the consideration that implicitly ac-
crues to the employer in every policy of group insurance was expressly admitted
here).
In Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 300 S. W. 599 (Ky., 1927), a clause
in the certificate and not in the policy prohibiting assignment of the insurance
was held reasonable because of the employer's interest in inducing continued
employment.
'Dees v. Travelers Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 214, 167 S. E. 797 (1933) (Recovery
allowed under a policy of group insurance which provided that liability was
to cease with termination of employment, although the business had gone into
the hands of a receiver and the policy had lapsed. The court comments on
the insured employee's ignorance of this change of employers and also the
lack of notice by the insurance company. The refusal to hold as a matter of
law that employment had terminated under the first employer seems to be a
frank recognition of the equities of the situation).
In Johnson v. Inter Ocean Casualty Co., 164 S. E. 411 (W. Va., 1932) the
court held that the insured employee was not affected by any change in the
policy unless he had notice thereof. Although this holding could be based
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payment to the employer is payment to the insurance company, and
seems to allow the employer to waive certain provisions in the policy., 4
In light of this minority view primarily concerned with the pecul-
iar nature of group insurance, there is still hope for the development
of law treating these contracts as sui generis. In furtherance of this
highly desirable trend it is suggested that:
(1) The insurance, in so far as paid for by the employer, be
not considered as a mere gratuity from the employer but as an actual
part of the employment contract.
(2) The employer, as part of the employment contract, be held
to owe to the employee and the beneficiary the duty of good faith and
due care in attending to the policy.
(3) Loss of interest in such policy be considered a naturally con-
templated damage caused by a wrongful discharge.
(4) If the employer be allowed to reserve the right to terminate
the insurance at will and without notice to the employee, although
such reservation might be deemed invalid because unconscionable
and against public policy, the employee, in any event, should be en-
titled to know that this right is reserved.
(5) Most important of all, a direct contractual relationship be-
tween the insurer and the insured employee be recognized, and the
insurer held to all the duties owed to the insured in an ordinary
policy, especially that of notifying the insured before terminating
liability. Consideration for these direct obligations on the part of the
insurer where the employer pays all of the premiums may be found
in the consideration passing from the employee to the employer and
thence in monetary form to the insurer. The same result might be
reached on the theory of equitable estoppal.
(6) Because of the insurer's superior knowledge of the provisions
contained in the master policy and of the impracticability of the em-
ployee's becoming thoroughly acquainted therewith, the strict rule of
written contracts be modified to avoid subjecting the insured em-
ployee to stipulations of which he knows nothing.
(7) The employer, because of his position as the sole inter-
mediary, be deemed the agent of the insurer to collect premiums,
upon the theory that the insured has his vested interest as a beneficiary, the
court in commenting upon the fact that the insured paid his part of the
premium without notice of the change, seems to favor the idea of an equitable
estoppel.
14All States L. Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 146 So. 393 (Ala. 1933).
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receive claims, inform insured of provisions of the master policy, and
to waive certain terms therein such as the termination of liability
upon cessation of employment when the insured resumes work after
a short lay-off.15
W. VASS SHEPHERD.
Libel and Slander-Absolute Privilege-
Executive Proceedings.
The defendant was a Lieutenant Commander in the United States
Navy. As Senior Medical Officer of a naval station, he wrote a
report to his captain concerning the qualifications of Commander X
in which he was alleged to have said that X's wife was a drug addict.
The defendant demurred to the wife's complaint. The facts showed
that the statements complained of were (1) authorized by law,
(2) germane to the subject matter involved in the communication,
and (3) made in pursuance of duty. Held: They were absolutely
privileged.'
It has been long recognized in the law of defamation that there
are occasions upon which statements made are absolutely privileged.
This doctrine was created to give immunity to the utterances of
public officials while in the performance of judicial or legislative
duties.2 Under the doctrine officials have been held to be exempt
from liability for their communications even where these have been
libelous per se, false, and malicious.3
In spite of the obvious danger of an undue extension of the
doctrine of absolute privilege, the case of Spaulding v. Vilas4 applied
it so as to include the heads of executive departments of the govern-
ment, thus establishing a precedent that tends to protect all high gov-
ernmental officials. 5 Under an application of this rule the following
communications have been held absolutely privileged: A letter from
the head of the Record and Pension Department to the President ;6
U Legislation declaring the employer to be the agent of the insurance com-
pany for such purposes would be the quickest method of achieving such a
beneficial end. This should not increase the cost of insurance much, if any.
Even so, cheapness of insurance should not be made to depend upon uncon-
scionable divices for avoiding a liability already contracted for.
'Miles v. McGrath, 4 Fed. Supp. 603 (D. C. Md. 1933).
'Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N. C. 106, 52 S. E. 307 (1905).
'Bradley v. Fisher, 3 Wall. 335, 20 L. ed. 646 (1872).
'161 U. S. 483, 16 Sup. Ct. 631, 40 L. ed. 780 (1895).8 DeArnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 -App. D. C. 167, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 163
(1904) ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413, Ann. Cas. 1913, 821 (1912).
'DeArnaud v. Ainsworth, supra note 5.
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a report by the Commissioner of Indian affairs to the Secretary of
Interior;7 a report from the Secretary of Treasury to the Pres-
ident ;8 a report from the head of a veteran hospital to the Veterans'
Bureau ;9 and a letter from a State Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion to a county superintendent.' 0 It is to be noted that each of these
communications was either by or to the head of some governmental
department.
In the English cases which apply the doctrine, one may find state-
ments to the effect that any communication in the nature of an act
of state is absolutely privileged.". A liberal interpretation of the
decisions leads to the conclusion that in England the rule extends to
the lesser public officers.12 It has certainly been advanced as far as
it has in this country.13
Reasons of policy protect certain types of official communications
from disclosure to the public and from use as evidence. 14 The ex-
tent of this testimonial privilege is not clearly defined, but it has been
invoked in England to protect officers of state from liability for
libelous utterances.' 5 Because it would tend to prohibit the dis-
closure of matters of which the public has a right to know, any ex-
tension of this rule is to be discouraged.
The instant decision fails to note one possible ground in support
of its result. It has been suggested that communications of military
and naval officers acting within the scope of their duty are absolutely
privileged,'0 because the civil courts will not take cognizance of mil-
itary or naval affairs. 17 This proposition has been applied in Eng-
land;18 but in this country, it was condemned by the only decision
which gave it direct consideration.' 9
EMMETT C. WILLIS, JR.
'Farr v. Valentine, supra note 5.
s Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F. (2d) 168 (App. D. C. 1927).
'Donner v. Francis, 255 Ill. App. 409 (1930).
" DeBolt v. McBrien, 96 Neb. 237, 147 N. W. 462 (1914).
SlIssacs & Sons, Lt'd. v. Cook, (1925) 2 K. B. 391, 397 (quoting with ap-
proval from ERAsER, LiEEL & SLANDER (6th ed. 1925) 196).
1 Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India, (1895) 2 Q. B. 189; Issacs &
Sons, Lt'd. v. Cook, supra note 11.
" Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India, supra note 12.
" Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 20 Sup. Ct. 701, 44 L. ed. 846 (1898);
WGiMoE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2378.
"Hennessy v. Wright, 21 Q. B. D. 509 (1888) ; Hughes v.'Vargas, 9 T. L.
R. 551 (1893).
'DeArnaud v. Ainsworth, supra note 5.
", NEwELL, LiBEL & SLANDER (4th ed. 1924) §385.
"Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94 (1869); Dawkins v. Lord
Rokeby L. R. 7 H. L. 744 (1875).
' Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233, 39 Am. Rep. 384 (1880).
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Municipal Corporations-Liability for Negligence in
Maintenance of Jail.
The plaintiff was arrested with a male companion and incar-
cerated in the town jail, a filthy, one-room structure, without separate
toilet facilities for men and women. She sues the city to recover for
the more or less permanent injury to her health occasioned by such
incarceration. Held, no recovery.'
Cities are generally held to be free from liability in cases of inten-
tional wrongdoing,2 but subject to it, for the maintainance of nui-
sances;3 so the problem raised by the case is limited to municipal
liability for negligence.
The general rule followed is that cities are liable for the negli-
gence of their agents when they act in their private capacity, but are
not when they perform a governmental function.4 This may, of
course, be varied by statute as in North Carolina where it is held that
a prisoner may recover under the Code 5 for injuries suffered from
-exposure to severe cold. 6 Three rules have been formulated to de-
termine this distinction between a private and a governmental act:
(1) If the act resembles those done by private corporations, it is
private. Thus, a city owning an assembly hall and charging non-
residents more than residents for its use is acting like any private
corporation.7 (2) If the city, as a municipality, derives any special
benefit from the act, it is private. Consequently, maintaining a park
is a governmental function,8 but operating bath houses at a profit
is a private act.9 (3) If the act promotes public health, safety, educa-
tion, or the care of the poor, it is governmental. So a city was held
not liable for negligence in maintaining a summer camp, even though
fees were charged the campers.10 However, none of these has proved
Franklin v. Town of Richlands, 170 S. E. 718 (Va. 1933).
Ansboro v. Wallace, 100 N. J. L. 391, 126 Atl. 426 (1924).3 Sandlin v. City of Wilmington, 185 N. C. 257, 116 S. E. 733 (1923) (To
-maintain a nuisance by allowing pipes to become so clogged up that sewerage
was forced into the street in front of plaintiff's house held to be a confiscation
-of iroperty).
'Scott v. City of Indianapolis, 75 Ind. App. 387, 130 N. E. 658 (1921).
N. C. CODE ANN (Michie, 1931) §1346 (The sheriff or jailer shall clean
.every room each day and furnish the prisoner with plenty of water . . . and
:fuel).
' Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N. C. 237, 9 S. E. 695 (1892).
Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 163 Pac. 670 (1917).
'Norman v. City of Chariton, 201 Iowa 134, 201 N. W. 279 (1920).
'Burton v. Salt Lake City, 253 Pac. 443 (Utah 1927).
'1°Kellar v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605, 178 Pac. 505 (1919).
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satisfactory, and there is very little agreement among the cases in
classifying particular acts.1
Because of the impracticability of utilizing so nice a distinction,
if by any other rule justice can be effected, it seems advisable to adopt
that rule. The basis of the present rule is that a sovereign state may
not be sued without its consent and that in performing a govern-
mental function a city acts for and as a part of the state. This im-
munity may properly be carried over to counties which are really
local administrative agencies of the state.12 But the nature of cities
is more nearly that of private corporations. They exist under powers
granted by and not as a part of the central government. This dis-
tinction between cities and counties is made apparent by the fact
that, in the recent trend toward centralization, in many instances the
counties have been made merely "administrative units"' 3 while the
cities have had their powers left intact.
As cities are essentially public service corporations, there seems
little reason for overriding the doctrine, that he who does wrong must
bear the loss, in favor of the legal anomaly that the loss must remain
where it falls. Furthermore, it is to the interest of the public that
cities be made liable, and particularly so in the case of injuries from
the condition of jails, as a means of enforcing upon them at least
some standard of decency.' 4 In sixteen states, the central authority
has no supervision or control whatever over the local penal institu-
tions, and in many of the others, the power is entirely advisory.' 5
The State Board of Charities and Public Welfare of North Carolina
has two employes a part of whose work is to inspect these jails, but
they are able to do so only at very infrequent intervals. On the basis
"Typical of the confusion are Rose v. Gypsum, 104 Kans. 412, 179 Pac.
348 (1919) (Building of streets is not, but maintaining them is a governmental
function and Hanrahan v. City of Chicago, 289 Ill. 400, 124 N. E. 547 (1919)
(Building of streets is, but maintaining them is not, a governmental function).
South Carolina has abandoned the distinction entirely because of the confusion
that it produces and holds that cities are never liable for negligence. Irvine v.
Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228 (1911).
'Larsen v. Yuma County, 26 Ariz. 367, 225 Pac. 1115 (1924).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, supp. 1933) §5780 (5) (The State School
Commission is directed to use the counties as "administrative units").
"Shields v. City of Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794 (1896) (Furches,
J. "Here it is in evidence that there is no committee in Durham charged with
the duty of examining and looking after the town prison, and that the com-
missioners had not done so since 1888. The law will not tolerate stch gross
negligence as this, without holding them responsible").
Louis N. Robinson, The Relation of Jails to County and State (1930) 2
J. Caim. L. 396, at 409.
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of their reports, the Board makes recommendations to the Governor.
As a result of the lack of supervision, conditions in some states be-
come at times unspeakably horrible.16
It is submitted that neither in theory nor as good policy can the
present rule be supported and that in the principal case the Virginia
court followed a super-refinement of the law, rather than manifest
justice.
PETER HAIRSTON.
Partnership-Suretyship--Rights of Third Party Who
Enters into Secret Agreement with One Partner.
Plaintiff and partner, engaged in selling tobacco as commission
agents of defendant, guaranteed payment of purchasers' accounts and
made a deposit to cover same. Each partner expressly agreed to be
bound by the acts of the other. Plaintiff's partner, wishing to sell to
a certain purchaser and knowing that plaintiff did not, induced de-
fendant to conceal the transaction from the plaintiff. The purchaser
subsequently defaulted, the partner having misappropriated the
goods.' Held, in an action to recover the guaranty deposit, defend-
ant's counterclaim for the unpaid price was valid because there was
not proof of such fraud as to release the plaintiff.2
Investigation discloses no case similar on its facts to the principal
one. The general rule as regards the effect of concealment upon
the surety's liability is that if the creditor knows or has good reason
to believe that the surety is being deceived or misled, or that he is
in ignorance of material facts, of which the creditor has knowledge,
the creditor is under a duty to disclose the facts to the surety, and if
he does not, the surety may avoid the contract.3 This rule leaves
some doubt as to what constitutes a material fact, the concealment of
McConnell v. Floyd County, 137 S. E. 919 (Ga. 1927) (The plaintiff was
confined to a small cage in which there was not sufficient room for the
prisoners to sleep nor sufficient ventilation, and which was not only filthy but
also overrun with varmints. The food was not nourishing and was unpalatable,
often consisting only of "sourbelly").
1The partner received the goods from the buyer's warehouse in some fash-
ion not appearing in the case.
"Woo King-Hsun v. Pemberton & Penn, 66 F. (2d) 811 (C, C. A, 9th,
1933).
' Bank of Monroe v. Anderson Bros. Mining & R. Co., 65 Iowa 692, 22
N. W. 929 (1885) ; Barnes v. Century Savings Bank, 149 Iowa 367, 128 N. W.
541 (1910) ; Province Security Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 269 Mass. 75,
168 N. E. 252 (1929).
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which will discharge the surety. Some courts have held the facts
concealed to be material if they were such that knowledge of them
might have caused the surety to act differently.4 Considerable author-
ity seems to hold that to be material, the fact must affect the surety's
liability and must bear directly upon the particular transaction to
which the suretyship attaches. 5 More recent authorities add the re-
quirement that the withholding must actually prove to be detrimen-
tal.6 If this latter type of holding means that the concealment must
be inherently detrimental so that the creditor should know that the
withholding will be likely to prove detrimental to the surety in the
ordinary course of the transaction, then there is some ground for
holding lack of fraud in the principal case on the ground that the
concealment of the sale by the creditor might not reasonably have
been calculated to prove detrimental. However, it seems that the
partner's request should have put the creditor on notice that there
was a probability of affecting plaintiff's risk to his detriment. If, on
the other hand, it means that the concealment of those facts is a
defense if it actually results in detriment to the surety, regardless of
the result reasonably to be foreseen, clearly the facts of this case
would establish fraud.
./
Granting the materiality of the facts concealed, it would seem
that the creditor in the principal case has not acted in the good faith
which his relationship demands.7 Moreover, it has been said that
the creditor's motive in concealing certain facts is immaterial ;8 that
the real fraud on the surety results from the situation in which he is
placed and not from what passes in the mind of the creditor.9
The proposition that concealment of the sale from the plaintiff
Barnes v. Century Savings Bank, supra note 3; Jungk v. Holbrook, 15
Utah 198, 49 Pac. 305 (1897).6 Calloway v. Snapp, 78 Ky. 561, 1 Ky. L. Rep. 229 (1880) ; Franklin Bank
v. Stevens, 39 Me. 532 (1855) (evidence that cashier, upon whom a surety
bond was taken securing prior as well as future accounts, was negligent in
keeping books, was held -not to be evidence of a material fact, concealment of
which would release the sureties. The court intimates that concealment of
previous defalcations of the cashier would constitute concealment of such
fact).
'Springfield Engine & Thresher Co. v. Parke, a Ind. App. 173, 29 N. E. 444
(1891); Damon v. Empire State Surety Co., 161 App. Div. 875, 146 N. Y. S.
996 (1914).
7 Bank of Monroe v. Anderson Bros. Mining & R. Co., supra note 2; Damon
v. Empire State Surety Co., supra note 6; Pidcock v. Bishop, 3 Barn. & Co.
605 (1825) (a leading case).
'Railton v. Matthews, 10 Clarke & F. 934 (1844).
1 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (3d ed. 1905) §472.
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was no defense to him on the counterclaim because he was in any
event bound by the acts of his partner is not persuasive. The prin-
ciple that a partnership is bound by the acts of either partner, in the
ordinary course of business, is well settled.10 The agreement be-
tween the partners in the principal case adds nothing to that rule.
Good faith, however, requires every partner to abstain from all con-
cealments, which may be injurious to the other partner or the firm."
If, therefore, any partner is guilty of such concealment, deriving
private benefit therefrom, he will be compelled to account to the part-
nership. 12 Any transaction so conducted is not in fact an act of the
partnership, and if the third party dealing with the firm has notice
of one partner's dissent, he thereby has notice that the implied agency
has ceased, and the contract with the other partner is not enforceable
against the dissenting partner.' 3 The plaintiff in the principal case
should not be held accountable to one having notice of his dissent
and acting in collusion with the fraudulent partner.14
E. D. KUYKENDALL, JP.
Practice and Procedure-New Trial-Unproved
Allegation of Perjury as Grounds.
In an action for negligently setting fire to plaintiff's timber a
witness testified that he saw defendant's servants set fire to a yellow-
jacket's nist, the fire spreading to plaintiff's land. After trial he
repudiated this testimony, and later repudiated the repudiation. On
appeal a motion for new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence
was filed in the Supreme Court. The case was remanded for new
"Wharton v. Woodburn, 20 N. C 647 (1839); GiLMORE, PARTNERSHnP(1911) §84.
" Kittelsby v. Vevelstad, 103 Wash. 126, 173 Pac. 744 (1918).
"STORY, PARTNERSHIP (7th ed.) §172, as cited in Kittelsby v. Vevelstad,
supra note 11, at 745.
"Johnston & Co. v. Dutton's Adm'r, 27 Ala. 245 (1855); Bank of Bell-
buckle v. Mason, 139 Tenn. 659, 202 S. W. 931 (1918). These cases involve
express notice to the third party dealing with the firm. It would seem, how-
ever, that no distinction should be made where the third party is given notice
of the partner's dissent by the conduct of the acting partner as in the principal
case.
" Sladen v. Lance, 151 N. C. 493, 66 S. E. 449 (1909) (involves the exten-
sion of credit to one partner by a third party having knowledge that such
transaction was in violation of the partnership agreement. The court in hold-
ing that the partnership was not liable said, "While the plaintiffs were not,
upon the evidence, guilty of that fraud which necessarily involves moral turpi-
tude, yet their conduct was a fraud upon the right of the defendant, for the
fraud in such case consists in the knowledge that the partner was violating,
with their aid, a stipulation of the partnership agreement, without the consent
of the other partner and against her express instructions").
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trial to be awarded in the lower court if on investigation the testi-
mony were found to be false.1
In North Carolina two methods of taking advantage of perjury
-as ground for new trial exist. (1) Motion for new trial for newly
discovered evidence.2 This motion may be made in the Superior
Court at trial term to set aside verdict, in the Supreme Court on
appeal, or in the Superior Court after decision on appeal has been
.ertified down, and before final judgment has been entered.3  The
power to grant new trial on such grounds, however, is exercised with
xtreme caution, and the appearance of the following facts. among
others rigidly required: (a) That due diligence has been used in
getting the evidence; (b) that the evidence is not merely cumulative;
(c) that it does not tend simply to contradict or impeach a former
-witness; and (d) that it is such that in another trial a different result
would probably be reached.4 Some courts, nevertheless, recognize
-perjury as a ground for a motion for new trial though evidence of
such tends simply to contradict or impeach a witness.5
(2) By a direct proceeding in the nature of an equitable remedy
to set aside a judgment for fraud.6 The rule in most jurisdictions,
however, is that such action is permissible only where the fraud is
extrinsic to the matter adjudicated, and that perjury, 'being an in-
trinsic fraud, is not ground for relief." The court in recognizing the
power to set aside a judgment for fraud where perjury exists re-
stficts its application, as in the former proceeding, by requiring:
(a) that the party must not be guilty of laches in discovering
-evidence and petitioning for new trial;8 (b) that the perjury is so
1 Robertson v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 205 N. C. 111, 170 S. E. 139 (1933)
remanding 204 N. C. 359, 168 S. E. 415 (1933).
'Pridgen v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co., 203 N. C. 62, 164 S. E. 325
(1932).
1 Black v. Black, 111 N. C. 300, 16 S. E. 412 (1892) ; Allen v. Gooding, 174
N. C. 271, 93 S. E. 740 (1917) ; State v. Lea, 203 N. C. 316, 166 S. E. 292(1932).
"Johnson v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913);
Brown v. Town of Hillsboro, 185 N. C. 368, 117 S. E. 41. (1923) ; McINTosH,
NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PaOcEuR (1929) 676.
'State v. Mounkes, 91 Kan. 653, 138 Pac. 410 (1914); Bernstein v.
Schneider, 72 Misc. Rep. 479, 131 N. Y. Supp. 340 (1911).
'Moore v. Gulley, 144 N. C. 81, 56 S. E. 681 (1907) ; Mottu v. Davis, 153
N. C. 160, 69 S. E. 63 (1910) ; McCoy v. Justice, 199 N. C. 602, 155 S. E. 452'
commented upon (1931) 9 N. C. L. Ru;. 218.
7 U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 25 L. ed. 93 (1878) ;, Robertson v.
Freebury, 87 Whsh. 558, 152 Pac. 5 (1915).8 Dyche v. Patton, 56 N. C. 332 (1857) ; Kinsland v. Adams, 172 N. C. 765,
90 S. E. 899 (1916).
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material that on another trial the result would probably be different ;9
(c) that the perjury is clearly proved by conviction of the witness or
good reason for failure to convict, 10 mere admissions by the witness
and even conviction on the oath of the defeated party being insuf-
ficient. 1
In the principal case motion for new trial was made on grounds
of newly discovered evidence. This, and a prior case in which new
trial was denied as the perjury was immaterial,1 2 are the only two
cases in which the North Carolina court has had to consider perjury
as a basis for such motion. Apparently the evidence of perjury has
met all the requisites of the motion except that of proof. It is not
clear from the instruction whether the Superior Court judge is to be
satisfied of the perjury only on conviction of the witness or good
reason for failure to convict, as would be the case in an action to set
aside a judgment for fraud, or may accept weaker proof. Some
intimation of the former construction possibly may be found in a
reference in the instruction to the aid of the solicitor in the investiga-,
tion, but this does not fully clarify the case, the status of which as
authority on the degree of proof of perjury short of conviction
necessary in a motion for new trial remains highly uncertain.
J. A. KLEEMEIER, JR.
Rape-Age of Consent Statutes-Civil Liability.
In an action to recover damages for statutory rape committed
upon a girl fifteen years old, it was held that a plea of consent was
not admissible to defeat recovery.1 This decision is based on the
view that the statute makes girls under the statutory age incapable of
giving consent, so that the defendant is liable civilly as well as crim-
inally in every case in which he consorts with one of the protected
class. Until recent years, this view of civil liability was held in all
jurisdictions of the United States and even today represents the over-
whelming weight of authority.2
Burgess v. Lovengood, 56 N. C. 457 (1856) ; Mottu v. Davis, supra note 6,
at 16, 69 S. E. at 64.
" Peagram v. King, 9 N. C. 295, 605 (1822) ; Dyche v. Patton, supra note 8,
at 33; McCoy v. Justice, supra note 6, at 608, 155 S. E. at 456.
'
1Horne v. Horne, 75 N. C. 101 (1876).
, Pridgen v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co., supra note 2.
1 Parsons v. Parker, 170 S. E. 1 (Va. 1933).
'Gaither v. Meacham, 214 Ala. 343, 180 So. 2 (1926) ; Herman v. Turner,
117 Kan. 733, 232 P. 864 (1925); Watson v. Taylor, 35 Okla. 768, 131 P. 922(1912); Hough v. Iderhoff, 69 Ore. 568, 139 P. 931 (1914); TORTS REsTATE-
WENT (Am. L. Inst. 1925) §76.
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Such an interpretation of consent statutes is open to criticism as
being unjust when one considers that the age specified varies from as
low as ten in Florida to as high as twenty-one in Tennessee. 3 Thus
a child of ten years will be condemned as a wanton and denied re-
covery in Florida while in Tennessee, a woman twice her age, who
consents to sexual intercourse, will be upheld as an innocent child
robbed of her virtue and will be rewarded with damages.
This rule is subject to the further criticism that under it a prosti-
tute who fully realizes the nature of her act is permitted to recover
even from a man whom she has seduced for the sole purpose of
extortion. Of course, extortion by threat of criminal prosecution is
possible even if there were no civil liability, but such methods are
unlawful and very far, indeed, from extortion aided by the law of
civil liability.
That the validity of these criticisms has gained some recognition
in recent years, is shown by the statute enacted in North Dakota in
19254 providing that "any female person under eighteen years of age
having voluntary sexual intercourse constituting statutory rape, is
guilty of fornication precluding recovery." However, this statute is
entirely too strict as it would make 'an infant of ten incapable of
recovering from a mature libertine who perpetrates her downfall. 5
What appears to be the best rule so far promulgated, is that
laid down in the New York case of Barton v. Bee Line,6 "There can
be no doubt that the purpose of the legislative enactment is to protect
the virtue of females and to save society from the ills of promiscuous
intercourse .... It is one thing to say that society will protect itself
' The following list shows how the states vary in this respect: 10 years-
Fla.; 14 years-Ga., Me.; 16 years-Ala., Ark., Del., Dist. of Col., Ill., Ind.,
Md., Mass., Mich., N. C., N. H., N. J., N. M., Ohio, Ore., Pa., S. C., R. I.,
Va., Ver., W. V., Wis.; 1 years-Ariz., Cal., Col., Ida., Kan., Ky., La., Minn.,
Miss., Mo., Mon., Nev., N. D., N. Y., S. D., Utah, Wash., Wy.; any minor-
Conn.
A peculiar type of statute is found in some states providing one age of con-
sent for chaste girls and a lower one for unchaste girls. In Nebraska the ages
are 18 years and 15 years respectively, in Oklahoma 18 years and 16 years, and
in Texas 18 years and 15 years. Tennessee goes even further and provides an
age limit of 21 years for chaste girls, 14 years for those moderately unchaste,
and 12 years for bawds.
Another digression is found in the Iowa statute establishing the age of con-
sent of the female at 16 years where the male is below 25 years and 17 years
where he is over 25 years.
IN. D. Corn. LAWs ANN. (Supp. 1925) §9578a.
'Braun v. Heidrich, 241 N. W. 599 (N. D. 1932) (In a suit by a sixteen
year old girl, the court recognized the unfairness of this strict rule and ex-
pressed its regret in having to uphold the statute.).
265 N. Y. S. 284 (1933).
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by punishing those who consort with females under the age of con-
sent; it is another to hold that, knowing the nature of her act, such
female should be rewarded for her indiscretion. . . . [Therefore,
she] .. .has no cause of action against a male with whom she will-
ingly consorts, if she knows the nature and quality of her act."
In denying the use of consent as a defense only where the girl
is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, protection is afforded
against promiscuous women profiting by their guilt at the expense of
men no more guilty than they, while, efficiently recompensing those
whose ignorance has made them puppets of more sophisticated men.
This interpretation of the consent statutes seems very commendable
in view of our present-day standards of equality between the sexes,
and it would seem that other jurisdictions might well adopt such
ruling in future litigation.
DONALD R. SEAWELL.
Taxation-Fate of the Trust as a Device to
Escape Inheritance Taxes.
The death transfer tax,1 held valid as an excise tax under both
federal and state laws,2 was first directed to transfers by descent or
will. Avoidance of the tax by various devices has led to the later
application of the tax to transfers made "in contemplation of death";
to transfers "by trust or otherwise, intended to take effect in posses-
sion or enjoyment at or after the death" of the grantor ;8 and more
specifically, under recent statutes, 4 to interests such as dower or
curtsey, joint tenancy5 or tenancy by the entirety,6 power of ap-
'In re Davis, 190 N. C. 358, 130 S. E. 22 (1925). ("In this country, the tax
is variously called an inheritance tax, a legacy tax, a transfer tax, and a suc-
cession duty"); cf. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225,
72 L. ed. 565 (1928)" (distinguishing transmission tax from succession tax).
'Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. ed. 969 (1900);
Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. l"5, 56 L. ed. 299 (1911) ; in re
Davis, supra note 1.
'Keeney v. New York, Stupra note 2; Rottschaefer, Taxation of Transfers
Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at Grantor's Death (1930)
14 MINN. L. REv. 453 and 613.
'Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 53 Sup. Ct. 951, 77 L. ed. 881(1933) commented upon (1934) 18 MINN. L. Ra,. 235; 43 STAT. 304 (1924), 44
STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §1094 (1928); 46 STAT. 1516 (1931), 47 STAT.
279 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. Supp. §1094 (1933); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie
1931) §7880 (1); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) §7880 (1).
" Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 224, 53 Sup. Ct. 157, 77 L. ed. 223(1932) ; cf. (1929) 8 N. C.-L. REv. 73 (inheritance tax on joint bank deposits).
'Tyler v. U. S. 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356, 74 L. ed. 991 (1930) com-
mented upon (1930) 44 HAiv. L. Rav. 130; Bank of Springfield v. White, 287
U. S. 577, 53 Sup. Ct. 290, 77 L. ed. 282 (1932).
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pointment, estate in expectancy which is contingent, proceeds of life
insurance, 7 and to certain specific types of trusts which courts had
held not included under the broad language of previous statutes.
The last are trusts which, instead of placing all benefit and control
of the trust completely beyond the reach of the settlor, reserve to
him certain powers, interests, or both,8 which may be roughly clas-
sified as follows: (1) the right to manage the trust estate; (2) the
right to modify the trust, as by changing the beneficiary, changing
the terms of the trust instrument, or terminating the trust completely
by revocation; and (3) the retention by the settlor, during his life, of
some contingent or certain right to receive a part or all of the income
or corpus of the trust.
To transfers of interest effective before death of the grantor
and irrevocable, the death transfer tax does not apply.9 On the
other hand, obviously such tax does apply to trusts clearly testa-
mentary under the Wills Act. Between these two extremes lies the
zone of difficulty. Courts have generally held that trusts reserving
to the settlor a power of revocation, a life interest, or both, are not
necessarily testamentary.' 0 To reach such property, it has been
necessary to lay aside technical trust and property considerations, and
look at the practical effect of the reservations of the trust instrument,
to find an intention by the settlor to retain dominion over the proper-
ties transferred, not consistent with an existing purpose to vest the
absolute right to present and future enjoyment in the beneficiaries."
In determining whether the transfer by creation of the trust was one
intended, in the words of the usual statute, "to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at or after death" of the grantor, there appears
to be a definite trend' 2 away from the test of whether any "title,"
Chase National Bank v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126, 73 L. ed. 405
(1929) ; Cook v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
'For detailed discussion of these various reservations of powers, see LEE,
MINmImIZN TAXES (1931) 317 ff.; ROBINSON, SAVING TAXES IN DRAFTING
WhLS AND TRUSTS (1930) 140-220; Rottschaefer, supra note 3. Note that
rapidly changing legislation in this field necessitates considering each decision
in connection with the specific statute involved, and with subsequent statutory
changes clearly in mind.
'Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 47 Sup. Ct. 461, 71 L. ed. 764 (1927);
Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L. ed. 1184 (1927);
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 76 L. ed. 772 (1932).
'Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 521, 526;
CAREY, CASES ON TRUSTS (1931) 157 note.
"In re Bostwick, 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 508 (1899).
' Rottschaefer, supra note 3; Surrey and Aronson, Inter Vivos Transfers
and the Federal Estate Tax (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 1332 (discussing a possible
rule based on substantiality of interest retained).
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"estate," or "interest" passed at death,' 3 toward the test of whether
there was any "shifting of economic benefits," 14 whether the death
was a "generating source of accessions to the beneficiaries,"' , or "a
source of valuable assurance passing from the dead to the living."'16
The first of the three types of reservations to the settlor, that of
managing the trust property, has been held not to make the property
taxable. 11 No valid objection to this holding is apparent, in view of
the general jurisdiction of equity over administration of trusts, avail-
able to prevent the settlor-trustee from diverting the trust benefit to
his own use.
Of the second type, it has been held in Masury's Estate' 8 and in
People v. Northern Trust Co.' 9 that retention of a sole power of
revocation does not necessarily make the trust taxable. These cases,
however, are not convincing authority on this point since the former
has been questioned in a subsequent case20 as possibly going too far,
and the latter seems to have been based, at least in part, on evidence
apart from the instrument that the settlor, in creating the trust, in-
ended to end completely and immediately any interest or control in
himself. Furthermore there is direct authority in a later case, that
such trusts are taxable.2 ' Where the settlor reserved power to re-
voke with the concurrence of the beneficiaries, the trust was held not
taxable.22 A like result was reached under the Federal statute of
1919 as to a trust in which the power to revoke was reserved to the
settlor jointly with the trustee,23 but a similar trust was held taxable
under a state statute.24
The Revenue Act of 1924 amended the Federal statute by includ-
"Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 74 L, ed.
410 (1929); May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 50 Sup. Ct. 286, 74 L. ed. 826(1930).
"' Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, fuprr note 1; Chase National Bank v. U. S.,
supra note 7.
Commissioner v. McCormick, 43 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), rcv'd in
McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784, 51 Sup. Ct. 343, 75 L. ed. 1413 (1931).
', Porter v. Commissioner, supra note 4.
' Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 13; Helvering v. Duke, 54
Sup%. Ct. 95, 78 L. ed. 87 (1933) aff'g 62 F. (2d) 1057 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
159 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 1127 (1899).
-289 III. 475; 124 N. E. 662 (1919).
' Matter of Keeney, 194 N. Y. 281, 87 N. E. 428 (1909) aff'd Keeney v.
N. Y., supra note 2.
'State and City Bank and Trust Co. v. Doughton, 188 N. C. 762, 125 S. E.
621 (1924).
"Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 13; McCormick v. Burnet,
supra note 15.
"Farmers'Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
' Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, &ipra note 1.
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ing a provision to reach any interest of which the decedent had at
any time made a transfer, "where the enjoyment thereof was subject
at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a
power, either by decedent alone or in conjunction with any person to
alter, amend, or revoke." 25 The recent cases of Porter v. Commis-
sioner2" and Cook v. Commissioner27 held taxable under this statute
trusts in which the settlor reserved power to modify, even though
this power was restricted by excluding modification or alteration in
his own interest or favor.
In Porter v. Commissioner, the court noted that "Congress.has
progressively expanded the bases for such taxation," and said
further: "The power did not amount to an estate or interest in the
property. . . . But the reservation here . . . made the settlor dom-
inant in respect of other dispositions of both corpus and income.
His death terminated that control, ended the possibility of any change
by him, and was, in respect of title to the property in question, the
source of valuable assurance passing from the dead to the living.
That is the event on which Congress based the inclusion 6f property
so transferred. . . . Thus was reached what it reasonably might
deem a substitute for testamentary disposition. . . . There is no
doubt as to the power of Congress to do so." While the case does
not specifically pass upon the question, the language of the decision
indicates that a trust in which the powers of revocation are jointly
held will be subjected to taxation.
The third type of reservation, the retention by the settlor of some
contingent or certain right to receive a part or all of the income or
corpus of the trust, is of uncertain effect at present. Many courts
have held that the reservation of a life interest in the settlor, even
without a power of revocation in the settlor, makes the trust estate
taxable.28  A late case, May v. Heiner,2 9 however, holds that such a
trust estate is not taxable under the Federal Revenue Act of 1918,30
the Court saying: "In its plan and scope the tax is one imposed on
transfers at death or made in contemplation of death and is measured
by the value at death of the interest which is transferred. . . . One
may freely give his property to another by absolute gift without sub-
' 43 STAT. 304 (d) (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. §1094 (d) (1928).
'Supra note 4. ' Supra note 7.
' Matter of Keeney, supra note 20; Leaphart, Use of Trust to Escape Im-
positionr of Federal Income and Estate Taxes (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 587.
=Supra note 13 commented .upon (1930) 44 HARV. L. R-y. 131.
'40 STAT. 1057, 1096, 1097.
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jecting himself or his estate to a tax, but we are asked to say that this
statute means that he may not make a gift inter vivos, equally abso-
lute and complete, without subjecting it to a tax if the gift takes the
form a life estate in one with remainder over to another at or after
the donor's death. It would require plain and compelling language
to justify so incongruous a result and we think it is wanting in the
present statute."
Is the doctrine of May v. Heiner to stand? There have been
intimations that possiby the taxing of such an estate might be uncon-
stitutional.31 This contention seems to have been forestalled by both
McCormick v. Burnet3 2 and Burnet v. Northern Trust Company,88
memorandum decisions based upon May v. Heiner, each containing
these words: "there [is] no question of the constitutional authority
of Congress to impose prospectively a tax with respect to transfers
or trusts of the sort here involved." Nowhere in May v. Heiner,
does the Court refer to Keeney v. New York, in which it held that
such a tax was constitutional under the New York statute. Rather,
the Court points out the incongruity under the federal statutes of
taxing a gift with reservation of life estate, while allowing an abso-
lute gift to go free, and insists upon plain words in the statute before
considering whether such estates may be constitutionally reached.
The subsequent passage of revenue laws including both a gift tax3 4
and provisions specifically reaching such trusts 5 makes the quoted
words of May v. Heiner no longer applicable.
Moreover, criticism of May v. Heiner as opening a wide avenue
to tax evasion seems amply justified by the McCormick case. The
trust there involved provided that the income should accumulate for
the life of the settlor, except that if her annual personal income
should fall below a certain amount, enough of the trust income to
make up the deficiency should be paid to her. On her death, the
' Reinecke v. Northern T. Co., supra note 13; (1930) 44 HARv. L. REv. 131.
"Supra note 15.
"283 U. S. 782, 51 Sup. Ct. 342, 75 L. ed. 1412 (1931).
"47 STAT. 245 (1932),.26 U. S. C. A. Supp. §1136 (a) (1933) ; cf. Burnet v.
Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 53 Sup. Ct. 369, 77 L. ed. 749 (1933).
146 STAT. 1516 (c) (1931) ; 47 STAT. 279 (c) (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. Supp.
§1094 (c) (1933) (including in the gross estate any property of decedent, "of
which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, under which
he has retained for his life, or for any period not ascertainable without ref-
erence to his death, or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death, (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom.")
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income was to go to her children for life, with the principal to desig-
nated remaindermen, except that, if the children should die before
the settlor, the corpus was to return to her.3 6 It was further pro-
vided that the settlor, with the eoncurrence of the children-benefi-
ciaries, could terminate the trust at any time. The Circuit Court
declared that although the provisions separately might not have made
the estate taxable, yet together, they indicated the settlor's intention
that her death should be such a "generating source" of property rights
in the beneficiaries of the trust as to make it come within the meaning
of the words of the statute. The case was "dealing with a most prac-
tical problem, taxation," and the irrevocable character of the trust
was not the determinative issue of the controversy, but was important
only as it helped illuminate the settlor's intention. "That the settlor's
death was the generating source of definite accessions to the benefi-
ciaries cannot be denied." This decision seems logical, and nearer
the actual intent of Congress as developed by later legislation, than
May v. Heiner, by which the Supreme Court felt itself bound in
reversing the Circuit Court's decision in the McCormick case.
From the undesirable results of the doctrine of May v. Heiner as
so plainly developed in the McCormick case; from the extent to
which the Supreme Court went in upholding state courts in Keeney
v. New York and Saltonstall v. Saltonstall; from the language of the
two memorandum decisions mentioned; and particularly from the
language in Porter v. Commissioner the indication is that the recent
amendments to the federal revenue laws and similar amendments to
the state statutes will be held constitutional ;37 and that trust estates
with either a contingent or certain interest in either corpus or income
reserved to the settior hereafter will be held taxable.
thus, it appears that the statutes taxing transfers upon death as
now written and construed, combined with the gift tax,38 have nar-
rowed toward extinction the avenues of escape from taxes upon
transfers of property without consideration.
H. B. WHITMORE.
: Cf. Helvering v. Duke, supra note 17 (trust agreement reserved to the
settlor the power to manage the trust, also the right to receive the corpus of the
trust if the beneficiary should die before the settlor-held, not taxable by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed by an equally divided Court, Hughes, C. J.,
not sitting) commented upon (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 1455.
Analysis of Helvering v. Duke and 33 CoL. L. Rav., supra note 36, seems
to strengthen this probability.
' See BREwsMR, IVINS -AND Pm.Lips, TE FEDErAL GiFr TAx, 1933.
